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After Serrano Ethics, Theology and the Law of Blasphemy
Abstract
In the latest academic apologia for the antics of bad boy photographer Andres Serrano, Damien Casey
attempts to portray him as not only a great liberal artist, but as a great Christian theologian too. One
suspects Serrano is laughing up his sleeve at the ease with which such 'postmodern' thinking can be
grafted on to the support of his iconoclasm. Casey rehearses some of the standard liberal excuses -though with no fresh argument -- and then settles down to some more novel points concerning theology,
Scripture and society. We will give some treatment of his standard liberal case first, then turn to Casey's
more original contributions, and finally comment on the current state of the law regarding this issue.
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Law & The Sacred: After Serrano Ethics, Theology and the Law of Blasphemy
Michael Casey, Anthony Fisher OP & Hayden Ramsay

In the latest academic apologia for the antics of bad boy photographer Andres Serrano, Damien Casey
attempts to portray him as not only a great liberal artist, but as a great Christian theologian too. One
suspects Serrano is laughing up his sleeve at the ease with which such 'postmodern' thinking can be
grafted on to the support of his iconoclasm. Casey rehearses some of the standard liberal excuses -though with no fresh argument -- and then settles down to some more novel points concerning
theology, Scripture and society. We will give some treatment of his standard liberal case first, then turn
to Casey's more original contributions, and finally comment on the current state of the law regarding this
issue.
Ethics
Casey, like other liberal defenders of work like Serrano's, presents the issue in terms of a clash
between the interests of artists in freedom of expression on the one hand, and the hurt such works may
cause to a section of the community on the other: what Christians are said to object to is the
'offensiveness' of Piss Christ. However, this is only part of the problem. Ethically speaking, what was at
issue in the Serrano affair was not simply offensiveness but 'blasphemy', the quite different wrong of
speaking against God or the Sacred, or ridiculing things consecrated to God or held sacred. Blasphemy
may occur even if no Christian is offended by the act in question (e.g. because no-one knows), and
even if the agent firmly believes his act to be directed towards a religious end. This is precisely what
makes blasphemy such a fascinating concept for contemporary philosophers, and not an out-moded,
'medieval' idea.
Of course, some philosophers (e.g. Feinberg 1985) believe that acts are never morally wrong unless
they adversely affect the interests of some human individual(s), either harming them, or at least causing
them serious offence. And for these philosophers, the only wrong in blasphemy, if any, is that it offends
others. However, more contemporary thinkers, including contemporary Aristotelians, Thomists, and
Kantians,1 do not require a victim for there to be a moral evil: self-regarding, trivial, slothful, wasteful,
cruel, or demeaning acts may offend or harm no one -- apart from the agent herself -- and still be
wrong. Naturally, the public display of blasphemous or sacrilegious works will generally be hurtful to
believers; indeed, the fact that such art-work is shocking to 'ordinary sensibilities' is generally regarded
as one of its principal virtues by its creators and promoters: this kind of art only works because it hurts.
However, our point is that, contrary to Casey's suggestion, hurtfulness to believers does not exhaust
the meaning of blasphemy. At least three other dimensions mattered in the display of Serrano's Piss
Christ.
First, accounts of the practice of religion which take it seriously on its own terms view it as a necessary
part of the fulfilment of the person -- rather like aesthetic expression and experience, in fact. Thus in
attacking religion the blasphemer is also attacking a crucial aspect of the human good, demeaning
human dignity and undermining human community through that choice. Moreover, as well as offending
believers and violating religion, blasphemy is an attack on God and/or the Sacred -- something
unthinkable to theists, unreasonable for agnostics (for whom a certain caution or respect for God-asnot-impossible is appropriate) and senseless for atheists (who, in any case, generally acknowledge 'the
Sacred' in some sense even as they reject a personal God). Finally, in blasphemous acts the agent not
only attacks other things but also un-makes himself. Blasphemy, like other moral wrongs, has grave
reflexive effects on character; it makes the agent offensive, irreligious and a hater of God, and this will
have serious effects on his activities, identity and relationships.2
Liberal supporters of Serrano, such as Casey, draw attention to the "originality" and symbolic
significance of his work, and characterise Christians who oppose it as backward and philistine. Casey
claims that the photograph questions boundaries between the sacred and the profane, thereby
"enacting what it represents"; this "threatens the identity of conservative Christians" who try to exclude it
from the public. However, to question a central intellectual distinction a work of art must do something
more than use a traditional gesture for insulting God, attack religion or offend believers. No critic of
stature has suggested this photograph constitutes a profound intellectual investigation, a realignment of
boundaries, whatever emotions it conjures up and titillates. Secondly, the work was criticised by

Christians of all complexions, as well as by those of other faiths and people of no faith. None of these
even vaguely registered a threat to their identity; indeed, one of the work's few good effects was to
clarify believers' sense of identity and common, interdenominational and interfaith, purpose. Thirdly, this
was not religious people interfering with public debate but the majority of the community protesting in
anger over the mis-use of the community's public space by a notorious artist and a self-appointed arts
'elite'. Casey seems not to have realised that for believers this was an assault upon their God, their
divine brother, an offence from their perspective at least as great as offences against persons or
property. In calling for an end to the display of this blasphemy in their public gallery people were not
asking that their fragile sense of identity or boundaries be left undisturbed, but that their God be
respected, their funds withdrawn from what they believed to be shameful and corrupting, and an end to
their unwilling collaboration in public invitations to see what is holy reviled.
Casey's approach also includes a new slant on the liberal case against mainstream Christians; he
invokes something called the "pluralist Church", and challenges the Christian community with
'intolerance' towards their own. He also criticises some Church authority(ies) -- it is not clear just which - for usurping Christians' religious symbols. We are not privy to Casey's peculiar ecclesiology, but surely
the claim that Christian and other religious leaders leading their people to oppose sacrilege and
blasphemy is "intolerant" and "authoritarian" towards their flocks is absurd. If observation of the 'First
Table' of the decalogue is not a solemn duty of Christian leaders, calling for clear and strong leadership,
then what is?
Another claim is that most religious believers have been blinkered and conditioned and so have not
recognised that this photograph reveals a "genuine and insightful religiosity" and is actually a
"prophetic" work -- something only Serrano, Casey and a few other like-minded observers of
Christianity have realised. Casey even makes the astonishing claim that Piss Christ is "profoundly
religious" and "speaks to the very heart of Christianity". Hyperbole aside, can he really mean this? As
the Serrano affair unfolded, the artist repudiated his earlier claims -- that his art is simply colourful and
that it is deliberately shocking -- asserting instead that, far from intending to scandalise, his goal all
along had been to increase the devotion of his fellow Christians by helping them identify more closely
with Christ in his pain, suffering and humiliation. Whether this revisionism was entirely candid on
Serrano's part might be doubted, but, as some of the artist's defenders observed, Jesus very likely did
lose control of his bladder in the crucifixion and was probably 'pissed on' by the Roman soldiers. The
photograph might be said merely to allude to this and to invite our compassionate engagement with the
real man. But do the sacred and the venerated really work in this way? This is not the place to explore
at length the implications of works such as Otto on the numinous, Eliade on the sacred and the profane,
Turner on the liminal, Douglas on sacred symbols, or Gadamer on mimesis and anamnesis in art. But
what can be said briefly is that none of these classic studies of the anthropology of religious symbols
would lend credence to the kind of "restoration" or "enhancement" proposed by Casey in his apologia.
Another liberal ploy has been to characterise those who disagree with public display of Serrano's
photographs as irrationally caught up in a 'dead white male' time warp, prissily avoiding the confronting
insights of modernity. On this front Casey argues that an exhibition of the work of Rembrandt taking
place at the Victorian National Gallery would have benefited from the continuation of the Serrano
exhibition; like Serrano, Rembrandt is dealing with "the ambiguity of the abject and its relation to the
sacred". The comparison between Serrano's photographs and Rembrandt's moving and human images
is comical, if not grotesque; the idea that Serrano can teach us something important about the relation
between God and man surely both. Pondering the relation between Christ's human life, suffering and
death and his divine nature, and the meaning of all of this for ourselves, has been part of Christian
tradition and enquiry at least since Chalcedon; what radical new insights might Serrano have to offer
here? We should recall that at the same time that Piss Christ was exhibited, Melbourne hosted another
Serrano exhibition featuring photographs of a woman urinating in a man's mouth, a woman squatting
naked before a horse as she masturbates it, a clergyman gagged with a studded leather collar etc.
Such a range of professional interests hardly suggest deep and well-informed theological and
philosophical reflection -- or the expressive genius of the Old Master.
Nevertheless, Casey plunges ahead, suggesting this is "good religious art", an exploration of the
theology of icons, and an 'Hegelian' reversal of our expectations about the divine so that God can more
clearly be manifested.3 It is difficult to know what to make of this. On the Hegelian point, suffice to say
that doing the 'rude and unexpected' is a cheap understanding of that philosopher's dialectic. While
making a Crucifixion scene in which Jesus had lost control of his bodily functions might not be

sacrilege, immersing a crucifix in urine can only be a profanation according to the standards of the
culture and religion of which it is an artefact, and photographing and displaying such a deed can only be
a blasphemy in that culture. Hegel would not have treated the ethical life of a community in so cavalier a
fashion, especially after the community had clearly spoken its preference in overwhelming numbers. On
the point about icons, if this work is to be regarded as pious and devout, can anything be impious? If
even this work is an icon, what on earth is not?
However, some persist in the idea that God and religion need the honesty and courage of the Serranos
of this world. Casey quotes Serrano's defence of the work as 'redefining and personalising' his own
relationship with God. Is this tongue in cheek? In Melbourne at the time of the controversy Serrano said:
I, you know, I just find that, and I started that work as an attempt to reduce and simplify a lot of the
ideas and images that I had been doing up until that time. I didn't do it to be provocative, I did it
because damn, the colours would look good, you know. [clapping and cheering] I mean, sometimes I
just feel like, you know, what I do has the simplest answers, but they're not good enough. People want
more of a story and I realise I try to give them a story, but sometimes I have to say: look, you're reading
too much into this shit really, you know.4
This hardly suggests a humble attempt to convert -- or 'redefine and personalise' his relationship to
God.
Theology
A more serious criticism is that Christians have lost the dramatic meaning of the central event of
Christianity -- for Casey, not the Resurrection but the Crucifixion -- domesticated their faith and lost
contact with the human suffering which Christ came to share and redeem.5 Casey believes Christians
have sanitised, 'quarantined', their central symbol. However, it is a radical misunderstanding of the
anthropology of symbols and sacramentals to imagine that by adding 'grime' to them the artist will help
make them more relevant and so devotional. Ironically, reinventing the image according to a pattern
less 'sanitised' than that received in the tradition may do the exact opposite. A crucifix certainly
expresses muck, and will not do so if worn as costume jewellery; but neither will it do so if simply
smeared with muck. To think a religious object can be extracted from its context and 'purified', 'restored'
or 'improved' by doing to it something unthinkable among adherents of that tradition, is a condescension
of the kind we rightly abhor in white Australians, Canadians or Americans who seek to 'improve' on
Aboriginal artefacts.6
In the second section of his paper, Casey makes it clear he regards those who object to Piss Christ as
not only deluded but dishonest: "there seems to be an aura of the disingenuous about any accusation
of blasphemy". It is a serious charge. A page earlier, however, he admits that "Piss Christ is indeed
blasphemous to the extent that it subverts the sacrificial interpretation of Christ's death". But if its critics
would just open their eyes and minds they would discover that it is good-blasphemous not badblasphemous: the blasphemy is acceptable because it "prophetically" "calls to mind something perhaps
even more essential and original to Christianity". Now just what that prophetic 'something' is, is never
made quite clear. Instead we read
In accordance with the logic of sacrifice anything overly ambiguous or permeable that defies the
principle of non-contradiction becomes the excluded middle... The abject... are those things that
blur the neat distinction between subject and object and consequently threaten the substantiality
of identity.
Try as we may, we cannot make head or tail of such passages, and there are many of them in Casey's
article. The word 'abject', however, occurs quite a bit here, and seems to function as a hooray word, as
opposed to 'sacrifice', a boo word. On side with 'the abject' (hooray!) are 'abominations' and 'mess',
heterology, powerlessness, permeability, and the 'many' mediaeval mystics who thought of Jesus as a
woman giving birth; on 'the sacrificial' side (boo!) are sovereignty, homophobia, 'ossified' doctrines and
dogmas, the clean and the impermeable. Later Casey returns to this dichotomy, comparing mainstream
Christianity, which has erroneously made the cross the great symbol of sacrifice and transcendence,
with the more profound Christology of Serrano. This artist-theologian tries "to return the crucifix to the
bodily processes of becoming", and thereby "to retrieve the meaning of the incarnation... Serrano
returns to this arche its repressed and forgotten element, the metonymic as expressed by the biological

processes that have been abjected by the symbolic order". In its sacrificial theology mainstream
Christianity does not understand its central symbol, the cross; only Serrano and Casey do, and "an
elite" who have "retained and lived" the true anti-sacrificial interpretation of the crucifixion.
Well, how does Casey justify this rather grandiose claim? In one of the few falsifiable propositions in the
paper he assures us that "despite common perceptions, the sacrificial interpretation of the death of
Jesus can be found in only one book of the New Testament, and that book, the Letter to the Hebrews,
is about the end of sacrifice". Really? The most recent comprehensive literature reviews by Peter Head
(1995) and Roger Beckwith (1995) demonstrate that the whole New Testament, and not just the Letter
to the Hebrews, is replete with sacrificial language, imagery and theology. They demonstrate
conclusively that
in Mark, in Matthew, in Luke and Acts, and in John and 1 John, the death of Jesus is described,
sometimes by himself and sometimes by others, sometimes explicitly and sometimes implicitly,
as sacrificial. Thus, in the Synoptic Gospels, he speaks at the Last Supper of 'my blood of the
covenant' (or 'the new covenant in my blood') 'which is to be shed for many' (or 'for you'),
Matthew's version adding 'for the remission of sins'. He is spoken of in John (and also,
incidentally in 1 Peter 1: 19 and Revelation 5: 6-10; 13: 8) a the slain 'lamb' of God, who by his
precious blood 'takes away the sin of the world' -- a lamb being an animal used in various
sacrifices, in sin offerings, guilt offerings, burnt offerings and peace offerings, as well as the
Passover sacrifice. In 1 Peter, again, Christ is said to be a sacrifice 'without blemish', that is,
without the moral blemish of sin, not the physical blemishes which disqualified OT sacrifices; and
we ourselves are said to be 'sprinkled; with his blood (1: 2, 19). Similarly, in 1 John we are said to
be 'cleansed' by his blood 'from sin' (1: 7, 9), the language of sprinkling and cleansing being
drawn from the OT sacrificial ritual, and perhaps from the Covenant sacrifice of Exodus 24, also
alluded to at the Last Supper. This is to recall only some of the more explicit passages, from
various books of the NT, in which a sacrificial interpretation of Christ's death is given. Passing on
now to the teaching of Paul, we find there similar statements, along with others... (Beckwith 1995:
130).
Here Head and Beckwith give a standard exegesis of the biblical texts, one that would be confirmed by
most contemporary Scripture scholars; it is in turn followed by serious-minded theologians (e.g. Fiddes
1989; Gunton 1988; Hengel 1981).
Yet, like Humpty Dumpty in Through the Looking Glass, Casey may well believe that "when I use a
word" -- or a symbol like a cross -- "it means just what I choose it to mean, neither more nor less".
Perhaps he would assert that his claim about sacrifice in the New Testament was not an exegetical
claim (since texts have no intrinsic meaning) but rather a 'creative reading' of the text through the
looking glass of contemporary cultural anthropology. Yet even a scant acquaintance with the classic
studies in the anthropology of religion by Edward Tylor, William Robertson Smith, James Frazer, Henri
Hubert, Marcel Mauss, E. E. Evans-Pritchard and Luc de Heusch, or the more recent standard works of
Barth (1961), Chilton (1992), Daly (1978), Hengel (1977), Yerkes (1952) and Young (1975 & 1979), or
even the more controversial but currently influential work of Rene Girard,7 all suggest very different
conclusions to Casey's. All these writers insist, for instance, upon the centrality of the sacrifice idea to
Christianity and the close relation, not opposition, of this concept to 'the abject'. Time and again one is
left wondering: does Casey even know the standard literature in this area?
Closely related to Casey's untenable contrast between sacrifice and abjection is another contrast,
between a (true) kenotic Christ stripped of all power and the (false) concept of Christ as a divine
master. This is not the place to rehearse the complexities and tensions in ideas like power and service
or divestment and glorification as understood in traditional and contemporary Christology: suffice it to
say that, at least since J S Whale's classic work in the early 1960s, no simplistic either-or, such as
Casey seems to require, has featured in serious theology. This is no mere debating point: Casey's
central claim is that Jesus' identification with "the poor and the oppressed and all those we treat like
shit" relies upon the Crucified being imaged in ignominy, covered in excrement. No Pantocrators here!
We need not reflect for long on Casey's powerless 'fellow sufferer' Christ to realise that this craving
represents a radical distortion of relationships. 'Misery loves company', certainly, but we do not take this
observation as a counsel and set about causing misery to give the miserable some companions. We
look to others to understand and respond to our pains, to do something to cure or at least palliate them.

We do not want the dentist to feel our toothache with us: we want him to remove it, kindly, but with a
certain detachment too. We do not want our counsellor to suffer disorientation, disintegration and
despair with us: we want her to help reorient, reintegrate and give hope to us, again with some
objectivity. In prayer we do not petition a fellow patient for a cure, but a physician.
Law
Curiously for a writer in a legal journal, Casey seems to be completely uninterested in the legal action to
which the Serrano controversy gave rise. He recalls that Archbishop Pell sought an injunction from the
Supreme Court of Victoria to restrain the National Gallery of Victoria from publicly displaying Piss Christ
and says little more about the law thereafter. However, reflecting upon that legal action may help clarify
just what was at issue in the dispute as it unfolded.
The Archbishop of Melbourne sought an injunction on the grounds that the public display of this
photograph would constitute a breach of Victoria's Summary Offences Act, as well as the common law
misdemeanour of blasphemous libel. The Act makes it an offence for any person to exhibit or display an
indecent or obscene figure or representation in a public place.8 The common law treats as criminal
blasphemy every publication which, beyond the decent limits of legitimate difference of opinion, treats
Christianity in an offensive, scurrilous and insulting manner calculated to outrage the feelings of
believers and sympathisers. In making these offences the grounds of his application, the Archbishop
was in effect seeking to restrain an apprehended breach of the criminal law with civil remedies. This is
something that the courts are generally very reluctant to countenance, for the reasons set forth most
famously in Peek's Case,9 and the Archbishop was no doubt aware his action was 'a long shot', but one
he thought worth undertaking.
There are two elements to the offence of blasphemous libel: a scurrilous insult to Christians and their
beliefs beyond the bounds of what is generally accepted as decent difference of opinion, and the
publication of that insult. There are two things which it is important to note here. First, blasphemous libel
does not involve 'censorship' in the sense of excluding certain opinions from being expressed in the
public realm. As early as 1840 it was held that the offence of blasphemy lies not in making rational
arguments against particular religious doctrines but in the incitement of "wild and improper feelings".10
In 1883 it was held that no offence is committed by the simple profession of a religious or irreligious
opinion: blasphemy required the tendency in a work "to shock, outrage, or ridicule" believers or their
faith.11 A decision in 1917 reiterated this, and emphasised 'vilification, ridicule or irreverence' as the
requirement for establishing blasphemous libel.12 In the words of Mr Justice Phillimore from an earlier
case, "a man is free to speak and to teach what he pleases as to religious matters" but were a person
to make a "scurrilous attack" on common religious doctrines "in a public place where passers-by may
have their ears offended, and where young persons may come, he will render himself liable to the law
of blasphemous libel".13
Secondly, blasphemy is an offence of strict liability. The only intention that has to be established is an
intention to publish, and clearly a decision by an art gallery to publicly exhibit a blasphemous work
manifests such an intention. Just as we argued above regarding the ethics of blasphemy, the good or
bad intentions of the author are irrelevant in determining at law whether the impugned publication
constitutes a blasphemous libel. Serrano's intention in producing this photograph and the National
Gallery's intention in displaying it remain unclear, but in the eyes of the law it does not matter whether
their intention was to shock, to revere or simply to display some nice colours. The crucial thing, from the
law's point of view, is the effect of the publication of this photo. As Lord Scarman stated in the most
important recent case in this area, "the character of the words published matters; but not the motive of
the author or publisher".14 The long string of blasphemy cases makes this much clear: had this case
proceeded it would have been very difficult for any judge or jury to conclude that a photograph of a
sacred Christian symbol immersed in excrement was anything other than objectively blasphemous.
For the sake of completeness, a few points might briefly be made about the offence under the Summary
Offences Act of public exhibition of an obscene or indecent representation -- the other ground of
Archbishop Pell's application. The leading formulation of the meaning of the words 'indecent' and
'obscene' is found in the English case R v Stanley: "indecent or obscene convey one idea, namely,
offending against the recognised standards of propriety, indecent being the lower end of the scale and

obscene being at the upper end of the scale".15 The leading case in Victoria is R v Close, in which it
was held that the ordinary sense of the word 'obscene' denotes something
indecent or disgusting. The notion is of that which offends good taste or decency, it could quite
properly be used of something which has no sexual significance, and of something which is not
likely to corrupt or deprave anybody.16
Like blasphemy, indecency and obscenity are not mere matters of opinion or interpretation: they are to
be understood in relation to objective characteristics and the prevailing standards of the community.
While recognising that human mores change over time, the law also recognises that public standards of
decent or civilised conduct never entirely disappear, and the enormous public support for the stand
taken by Archbishop Pell -- one poll suggested 93% support -- provides the most powerful recent
instance of this.
The obscenity aspect of the Archbishop's application for an injunction received very little public attention
and no comment from writers such as Casey -- primarily because from Day One of the controversy the
debate was cast in terms of blasphemy. But this itself highlights one of the most remarkable aspects of
the whole affair. Various attempts were made in the 1960s and 1970s to use the law concerning
indecency and obscenity to insist on civilised standards in art, film and literature. These attempts
generally ended in failure and in the rare cases of success turned out to be counter-productive.
Ironically, in the far more secularised and pluralistic environment of the 1990s, a case was made for the
supposedly out-moded concept of blasphemy which grew more and more compelling amongst the
general public with each passing day. Although the court action failed, the moral victory went to the
Archbishop, and this significant sociological development offers no comfort to the regnant values of
Damien Casey's 'liberal excess', the values of the cultural ancien regime.
We come at last to the judgment of Mr Justice Harper. His Honour explained his own approach with the
aphorism of Chief Justice Dixon: "there is no other safeguard to judicial decisions in great conflicts than
a strict and complete legalism".17 Whilst acknowledging that the offence of blasphemous libel
undoubtedly continues in English law, His Honour held that the continuing existence of the offence in
Australian jurisdictions was uncertain.18 But even if there is such an offence, His Honour was
persuaded by the claim made by counsel for the Gallery that an essential element for the offence of
blasphemous libel is a risk of breach of the peace or perhaps widespread civil unrest.19 Remarking that
there was "no evidence before me of any unrest of any kind following or likely to follow the showing of
the photograph in question", the judge concluded that there would be no breach of the criminal law if
Piss Christ were to be publicly displayed and thus no offence in prospect which could rightly be
prevented by injunction.20 His Honour also rejected the argument that the exhibition of the photograph
would be "indecent" or "obscene" under the Summary Offences Act, holding that these words "are
associated more with lewdness than with blasphemy".21 But in the end it was the principle that civil
courts should not grant injunctive relief "where the legislature or the common law provide sanctions
which have not been exhausted" that was decisive in this case.22
There are several points to be made about this judgment. First, whatever the history of the offence, it
seems quite clear that the offence continues to exist in Australian jurisdictions. Mr Justice Harper
himself refers to section 469AA of the Victorian Crimes Act which gives the court discretion to order the
seizure and destruction of a blasphemous publication upon conviction -- clear evidence that the offence
has been recognised by the Parliament of Victoria. Whether the offence has lapsed is another question,
but the Archbishop's action and the absence of any ruling on this point at least leaves the continuance
of the offence an open question.
Secondly, the finding that a breach of the peace is a necessary element of blasphemous libel is the
weakest aspect of the (admittedly hurried) judgment. There is only one case among the authorities to
support this proposition,23 and this was not cited in the judgment. More importantly, this view was
expressly rejected by two members of the House of Lords in Whitehouse v Lemon and omitted as an
element in the formulation of the offence provided by two others. The irony in this aspect of the
judgment is that at least two breaches of the peace did indeed arise from the publication of the
photograph, and the second of these breaches was the ostensible reason for the sudden cancellation of
the entire exhibition. On prudential public policy grounds alone it would seem unwise to insist on breach
of the peace as an element of such an offence.

Thirdly, Mr Justice Harper restricted obscenity to "lewdness" or matters pertaining to sex. But as
observed above, the leading Victorian case on the matter in Victoria, R v Close, held that the concept
"quite properly" encompasses matters which have no sexual component and which are not likely to
corrupt or deprave anyone. Here, once again, law matches well the principles of ethics and theology
articulated above, and the display of Piss Christ would seem to be a prime candidate for obscenity so
defined.
In the end, however, the case was decided on the principle that the court should not employ its civil
jurisdiction to provide an injunction as a means of preventing the commission of a crime. This leaves
open the question of the basis, nature and scope of the offences of blasphemous libel and obscenity.
One thing the Serrano affair made abundantly clear was that the reasons for such a law remain as
compelling today as at any time in the past. The protection of individual feelings, civil peace, and
commonly accepted standards of civilized behaviour (which themselves demand respect for God,
religion and morality), necessitate the continuation of this offence just as surely as they require proper
laws against the vilification of ethnic and religious minorities -- even if these reasons fail to exhaust the
evil of blasphemy as understood in ethics and theology. The case of Pell v National Gallery of Victoria
serves to highlight the need to extend to Christians the anti-discrimination and anti-vilification
protections increasingly being extended to other minorities, and possibly the need to extend to other
religions the protection of the anti-blasphemy laws.
Some people have opposed anti-vilification laws as a totalitarian restriction on their freedom of
expression; commentators such as Casey in the wake of the Serrano affair have been given to
hysterical claims about the spectre of censorship and declining artistic freedom. In fact, however, the
outcome of this affair represents a triumph for tolerance and mutual respect in our society. Whereas
Christianity and the values of ordinary people were once considered fair game by the cultural and
artistic arriere-garde, there is now a little more sensitivity and respect. This can only be a good thing for
all those who sincerely value authentic tolerance and wish to see the expansion of its realm. Serrano
was something of a turning-point in Australian public affairs. After Serrano we need high-quality and
accessible debate in ethics, theology and law, not the fashionable but unintelligible responses of an
increasingly irrelevant academic elite.
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1 E.g. Sherman 1997; O'Neill 1996; Finnis 1998.
2 See Ramsay and Fisher 1999.
3 Neither the claim about icons nor that about Hegel is sourced.
4 ABC Radio National, Arts Today, 14/10/97.
5 Casey believes that the title 'Piss Christ' somehow invokes the irony of the notice hung above the
crucified One, 'The King of the Jews'; Piss Christ tries to re-educate us in the shocking irony of the
Roman guards' gesture. Perhaps Casey does not grasp the full depth of the irony: the ironic reality for
those who venerate the crucifix is that Christ was indeed the King of the Jews, unrecognised and
executed; the 'last laugh' here is God's.
6 Two of us argue this more fully in: Ramsay & Fisher 1999.
7 Girard's works are well introduced to the English language reader in Williams 1988. His work on
violence, sacrifice and mimetic desire has been applied by several theologians.

8 Summary Offences Act 1966 (Vic), s. 17(1)(b).
9 Peek v New South Wales Egg Corporation (1986) 6 NSWLR 1, per Kirby P (as he then was) in the
New South Wales Court of Appeal.
10 R v Hetherington (1840) 4 St Tr (NS) 563 at 591.
11 R v Ramsay and Foote (1883) 15 Cox C C 217.
12 Bowman v Secular Society [1917] AC 407 at 445, per Lord Parker.
13 R v Boulter (1908) 72 J P 189.
14 Whitehouse v Lemon [1979] AC 617.
15 R v Stanley [1965] All ER 1035 at 1038.
16 R v Close [1948] VLR 445 at 463.
17 Pell v Trustees of the National Gallery of Victoria, Supreme Court of Victoria, 8-9 October 1997. No
7358 of 1997. Transcript of judgment. Victorian Government Reporting Service. 3. (Hereafter cited as
Pell v NGV)
18 His Honour accepted the argument that the origins of the offence lay in historical circumstances
peculiar to England and its established church; because the Anglican Church was never the
Established Church of Australia, it was uncertain whether the offence had survived transplantation to
the colonies; but even if it had been transplanted it may have "lapsed through desuetude". Here he was
relying upon argument of counsel for the Gallery derived largely from the New South Wales Law
Reform Commission Report, Blasphemy (1994), but that report's discussion of blasphemy is
philosophically very weak, and its historical analysis tendentious. As a consequence, its conclusions -that retention, codification or replacement of the offence would be unjustified and contrary to free
speech and multiculturalism -- were unpersuasive and have not been followed in that jurisdiction. The
Report's principal argument for abolition of the offence was that it had been little used in the previous
fifty years: ironically it was only three years later that the prosecution of this very offence became a
matter of national interest.
19 Pell v NGV, at 4-6, quoting the NSWLRC report at length in support.
20 Pell v NGV, at 8-9.
21 Pell v NGV, at 7-8, citing the definitions given in the Butterworths Australian Legal Dictionary and the
Macquarie Dictionary in support.
22 Pell v NGV, at 9-10.
23 R v Gott (1922) 16 C App R 86.

